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In national industrialization processes, direct foreign 
investment, together with the incorporation of new 
technologies, enables the modernization of industry to 
go hand in hand with the promotion of its develop-
ment. However, the goals of the transnational cor-
porations that take part in national industrialization 
processes do not always coincide with the economic 
policy objectives of the host State. Hence, almost all the 
governments of the region have set up, in varying 
measure, administrative systems to assess, authorize, 
register and occasionally supervise foreign participa-
tion. There is always some tension between the aims of 
modernization, with its reduced control and restric-
tion of the activities of the transnational corporations, 
and national part icipat ion, which implies more 
supervision. The importance of the Colombian case, 
which is examined in this article, lies in the way in 
which it resolved this tension by assigning a subsidiary 
role to foreign participation, particulary in the in-
dustrial field. To verify the impact of this policy, a 
survey was made of the 26 largest firms in the man-
ufacturing sector in which foreign participation was 
involved. The results of this survey are summarized in 
the second part of this article. 
*Staff member of the Joint ECLAC/CTC Unit on Trans-
national Corporations. 
Introduction 
Studies on Colombian development generally 
distinguish between two stages in the in-
dustrialization process and in the official policy 
relating to it: the easier stage of import substitu-
tion, and the more difficult stage, in which sub-
stitution is combined with the promotion of ex-
ports of manufactures. The two stages are sepa-
rated by the balance-of-payments crisis of the 
1960s and the turnaround in economic policy 
imposed by Decree-Law 444 of 1967. 
The result was not so much a structural 
change in the process of development as a transi-
tion towards a more complex economic policy, 
which had diverse consequences for the agents of 
development, above all the foreign enterprises. 
In this connection Ranis (1976, p. 99), for ex-
ample, indicates that "... during import substitu-
tion investment is channelled mainly into the in-
dustrial sector of the LDC, with the main contribu-
tion of the MNC one of adding to industrial sav-
ings, capital accumulation, and management 
capacity. At this point in time, when the market, 
the role of relative prices, efficiency, and so forth 
have been put aside, at least temporarily, in order 
to ensure as rapid a rate of industrial growth as 
possible, foreign capital and management can 
provide an important assist. This is usually a pe-
riod when technology choice generally consists 
mainly in the act of turn-key borrowing from the 
"shelf of advanced country technology... In this 
period, the watchword is getting the job done as 
quickly as possible, with relatively little concern 
for efficiency —certainly not at international 
prices". 
As the industrial sector advances, according 
to Ranis (1976, p. 101), "... the role of appropri-
ate technology and output mixes in penetrating 
international markets becomes much more im-
portant. One can now conceive of a benign and 
productive combination between the advantages 
of the MNC ... and the growing domestic expertise 
based on the specificity and peculiarities of the 
local resource endowment and institutional fac-
tors. ... Under generally more competitive con-
ditions there is an increasing need for coming up 
with the right amalgam of imported and adaptive 
technologies and output mixes to ensure the con-
tinued outward-looking expansion of the in-
dustrial sector". 
In the postwar period, the manufacturing 
sector gradually became the engine of the Co-
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lombian economy, raising its 13.5% share of the 
GDP in 1950 to 18.4% in 1975, aided by a clear 
policy of industrial import substitution (ECLAC, 
1978). From that year, however, it began to lose 
dynamism and suffered a considerable fall in 
1981-1983. At all events, the share of imports in 
the total supply of manufactures dropped from 
20% in 1950-1952 to 15% in 1965-1967, while 
imports corresponding to intermediate indus-
tries fell from 39% to 18%. Between 1965-1967 
and 1979, import substitution declined in the 
traditional industries (2.5% to 5.3% of the total 
supply) and in the intermediate industries 
(18.2% to 21.3%) on account of the notable in-
crease in the capacity to import at the end of the 
1970s. Nevertheless, this process continued in 
the more complex industries (metal products 
and machinery), so that the proportion of im-
ports in the total supply of these manufactures 
fell from 58.4% to 43.3% (DANE, 1977,1981aand 
1981 b). The share of exports in the total produc-
tion of manufactures rose from 0.2% in 1950-
1952 to 9.2% in 1975, although it suffered a 
notable fall in 1979 (to 6.8%) through the loss of 
impetus in traditional industry (foodstuffs and 
textiles) and intermediate industry (chemicals 
and petroleum products). In these cases there is a 
clear distinction between two phases in the policy 
of industrial import substitution, namely, those 
of 1950-1957 and 1967-1982. 
Thus, in the period 1967-1982 Colombian 
industrial policy became more ambitious, si-
multaneously promoting import substitution in 
technically more complex industries (motor vehi-
cles, petrochemicals, machinery) and the export 
of manufactures (above all those produced in the 
industries set up in the easy stage of import sub-
stitution), with the initial aim of alleviating the 
scarcity of foreign exchange brought about by 
the balance-of-payments crises. 
For the enterprises with foreign participa-
tion, the new orientation of economic policy had 
implications which went beyond import substitu-
tion in its second phase or the export of man-
ufactures, since they had to adapt themselves to a 
new administrative system based on exchange 
control in order to assess, authorize, register and 
control numerous aspects of foreign participa-
tion, which made itself felt in controls over in-
vestment, remittances (of profits, royalties and 
interest) and foreign trade (imports and ex-
ports). To these measures were added, by virtue 
of Decision 24 of the Commission of the Car-
tagena Agreement, the obligation to convert 
themselves into mixed enterprises in order to 
enjoy the benefits of the Andean market, and 
other limitations (e.g., some sectors were re-
served for national and mixed enterprises; access 
to domestic credit and conditions for external 
credits were defined; and a ceiling was fixed for 
reinvestment unless officially authorized). 
Obviously, Decree 444 of 1967 imposed limits on 
the activities of enterprises with foreign 
participation from the balance-of-payments an-
gle, while the Common System (Decision 24) es-
tablished broad objectives in order to favour 
national and mixed enterprises in the enlarged 
market which resulted from Andean integration 
and to strengthen the bargaining capacity of the 
member countries vis-à-vis foreign participation. 
In essence, the official policy designated enter-
prises with foreign participation as agents of de-
velopment and tried to ensure through the new 
system that they achieved the goals of the 
economic policy in a much wider sense than that 
of the balance of payments. 
I 
Official policy: a subsidiary role for 
foreign participants 
in the Colombian industrialization process 
The new policy vis-à-vis foreign participants in 
the industrialization process was based on the 
following aims: to channel direct foreign invest-
ment towards substitution in the technologically 
more complex industries; to promote the export 
of manufactures; to reduce the foreign exchange 
DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN COLOMBIA INDUSTRIALIZATION / Michael Mortimon 69 
cost of the participation of foreign enterprises; 
and to increase the share of local capital in the 
industries dominated by foreign enterprises. 
In 1967 and 1983 the direct foreign invest-
ment registered in the manufacturing sector was 
progressively directed towards the metal-
Table I 
COLOMBIA: DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT REGISTERED IN 
THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR, 1967-1983 
(Millions of dollars) 
lsic Industrial Division 
Percentage 
breakdown 
1967-1970 1975 1980 1983 1967-1970 1983 
A. Current values 
31. Manufacture of food, beverages and 
tobacco 
32. Textile, wearing apparel and leather in-
dustries 
33. Manufacture of wood and wood 
products, including furniture 
34. Manufacture of paper and paper 
products; printing and publishing 
35. Manufacture of chemicals and of 
chemical, petroleum, coal, rubber and 
plastic products 
36. Manufacture of non-metallic mineral 
products, except products of petroleum 
and coal 
37. Basic metal industries 
38. Manufacture of fabricated metal 
products, machinery and equipment 
39. Other manufacturing industries 
Total 
B. Constant values (1980)a 
31. Manufacture of food, beverages and 
tobacco 
32. Textile, wearing apparel and leather in-
dustries 
33. Manufacture of wood and wood 
products, including furniture 
34. Manufacture of paper and paper 
products; printing and publishing 
35. Manufacture of chemicals and of 
chemical, petroleum, coal, rubber and 
plastic products 
36. Manufacture of non-metallic mineral 
products, except products of petroleum 
and coal 
37. Basic metal industries 
38. Manufacture of fabricated metal 
products, machinery and equipment 
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"Deflated by the wholesale price index of the United States. 
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Table 2 
COLOMBIA: DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT AUTHORIZED IN 
THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR, 1970-1976 AND 1977-1981 












Manufacture of food, beverages 
and tobacco 
Text i le , wear ing appare l and 
leather industries 
Manufacture of wood and wood 
products, including furniture 
Manufacture of paper and paper 
products; printing and publish-
ing 
Manufacture of chemicals and of 
chemical, petroleum, coal, rubber 
and plastic products 
M a n u f a c t u r e of non-meta l l ic 
mineral products, except prod-
ucts of petroleum and coal 
Basic metal industries 
Manufacture of fabricated metal 
products, machinery and equip-
ment 










































































Source; 1970-1976, calculated on the basis of Medina Torres 1978, p. 93. 1977-1981, calculated on the basis of foreign 
investment applications approved by the National Planning Departament of Colombia. 
"Whereas the totals for 1970-1976 represent 100% of the authorizations for the said period, the totals for 1977-1981 
represent the authorizations exceeding US$ 100 000 (around 83% of thé total amount authorized in the said period). 
working industries which grew at a real annual 
cumulative rate of close on 4%, so that their share 
in the recorded total rose from 15% in 1967-1970 
to over 24% in 1983 (table 1). This is confirmed 
by analysis of the investments authorized for the 
same period (table 2). Not only did the share of 
the metal-working industry in the total au-
thorizations rise from 20% to 34%, but also the 
average of each investment authorized in that 
industry soared from US$ 0.4 to US$ 3.5 million, 
whereas the average for all industrial divisions 
rose only from US$ 0.5 to US$ 2.7 million. The 
change of direction in the authorizations clearly 
showed itself in the records of direct foreign 
investment in the manufacturing sector for 1981. 
The policy of directing this investment towards 
substitution in more complex industries such as 
the motor —vehicle and capital— goods industr-
ies was quite successful, judging by the figures on 
economic activities (tables 1 and 2). In the pro-
motion of exports of manufactures, however, 
the enterprises with direct foreign investment 
have not displayed such positive results. For var-
ious reasons —mainly a competitive exchange 
rate and a broad programme of incentives— the 
manufacturing sector achieved a notable in-
crease in its exports in 1967-1974 (Echavarria 
and Perry, 1983). After that period it lost im-
petus. The tax credit certificate benefits were 
reduced and the exchange rate for exports de-
teriorated (comparing 1975-1982 with 1967-
1974). To stimulate the activity of foreign enter-
prises, a policy was applied making new direct 
foreign investment conditional on an increase in 
the values of manufactured exports. The gov-
ernment authorities must have believed that the 
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Table 3 
COLOMBIA: DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT AUTHORIZED SUBJECT TO 












Manufacture of food, beverages 
and tobacco 
Textile, wearing apparel and 
leather industries 
Manufacture of wood and wood 
products, including furniture 
Manufacture of paper and 
paper products; printing and 
publishing 
Manufacture of chemicals and of 
chemical, petroleum, coal, rubber 
and plastic products 
Manufacture of non-metallic 
mineral products, except prod-
ucts of petroleum and coal 
Basic metal industries 
Manufacture of fabricated metal 
products, machinery and equip-
ment 













































































Source: Calculated on the basis of foreign investment applications approved by the National Planning Department of Colombia. 
includes only investments exceeding US$ 100 000 (equivalent to 83% of the total value of the authorizations for the 
manufacturing sector). 
high concentration of exports produced with di-
rect foreign investment in a limited number of 
enterprises1 would contribute to the success of 
the policy, since with a few export contracts there 
would be a notable change in the export per-
formance of the enterprises, especially of those 
associated with the old substitution policy. De-
spite the fact that 51% of the authorizations for 
new direct foreign investment during 1977-1981 
(table 3) involved contractual commitments with 
regard to exports of manufactures (above all in 
the chemical industry), however, the exports of 
the enterprises with this investment deteriorated 
vis-à-vis those of national enterprises (table 4). 
1
 Montoya ( 1982) found that more than two-thirds of the 
manufactures exported by. the transnational corporations 
from Colombia in 1978 came from industrial groups (îsic) 
where three corporations generated 75% of the total value of 
those exports. 
With the exception of Cartón Colombia and, to a 
lesser degree, Cristalería Peldar, it is clear that 
the exports of manufactures did not come mainly 
from the dominant foreign enterprises associ-
ated with the phase of easier substitution, but 
from others. Thus, although it is obvious that the 
results of the policy of tying new investment to 
export contracts did not respond to the official 
intentions, it is no less certain that the specific 
policy applied on the subject has motivated many 
new foreign participants to export manufactures 
(tables 3 and 4). 
With regard to the aim of reducing the for-
cing exchange cost of foreign participation in the 
manufacturing sector2, quite good results were 
obtained even during the foreign exchange 
2Several official studies have substantiated the high cost 
of direct foreign investment (Banco de la República, 1974, 
1973 a and 1973 b). 
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Table 4 
COLOMBIA: CUMULATIVE GROWTH RATES OF THE MANUFACTURES 












Manufac tu re of food, bev-
erages and tobacco 
Textile, wearing apparel and 
leather industries 
Manufac tu re of wood a n d . 
wood p r o d u c t s , inc lud ing 
furniture 
Manufacture of paper and 
paper products; printing and 
publishing 
Manufacture of chemicals and 
of chemical, petroleum, coal, 
rubber and plastic products 
Manufacture of non-metallic 
m i n e r a l p r o d u c t s , excep t 
products of petroleum and 
coal 
Basic metal industries 
M a n u f a c t u r e of fabricated 


















































































Source: Calculated on the basis of Montoya (1982), tables 7, 8 and 27. 
aFor 1969-1971, the coverage amounted to 67% of the enterprises with direct foreign investment. 
bAU the enterprises with direct foreign investment equivalent to 30% or more of their registered capital. 
boom period generated by the record coffee ex-
ports of 1976-1980, which might well have 
caused a relaxation in the policy adopted. The 
greatest outflow of foreign currency was associ-
ated with the so-called importing vocation of the 
foreign enterprises. According to the calcula-
tions ofMisas (1983), between 1975-1979, i.e., at 
the height of the foreign exchange boom, the 
imports of these enterprises fell from 33% to 
22% of the total value and inter-enterprise trade 
in total private imports fell from 29% to 21%. 
External payments (profits, dividends, royalties 
for technical services) also declined during the 
1970s as a proportion of the direct foreign invest-
ment recorded in the sector (table 5). By com-
ponent, and as a percentage of the direct foreign 
investment recorded, royalties fell appreciably, 
payments for technical services remained con-
stant and profits and dividends rose slightly. The 
modest size of the increase in payments of profits 
and dividends measured in proportion to the 
direct foreign investment is surprising for two 
reasons. In the first place, from 1977 onwards a 
higher limit was applied to the remittances of 
profits (20% instead of 14% of the investment 
registered). Then towards the end of the 1970s 
there arose a problem of "capital in limbo", that 
is, non-remittable profits which exceeded the 
new limit. The problem was solved in 1978 by 
means of Resolution 29 of the Economic and 
Social Policy Council, which permitted the re-
mittance of 50% of the capital in limbo, provided 
that the foreign investor used the other half to 
purchase special bonds of the Industrial De-
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Table 5 
COLOMBIA: MAIN EXTERNAL PAYMENTS LINKED WITH FOREIGN 
PARTICIPATION IN THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR, 1970-1982 




































































































































Source: Banco de la República, Oficina de Cambios and data from INCOMF.X. 
aAll sectors except petroleum. 
bExcluding royalties on cinematographic material. 
velopment Institute. The sum invested in these 
bonds in 1978-1981 amounted to almost two 
million Colombian pesos (half of it associated with 
only three foreign enterprises: Colgate Palmo-
live & Cía., Propal S.A. and Fábrica Colombiana 
de Automotores S.A.). This scant growth implies 
that even in the exceptional conditions of a for-
eign currency boom a reduction was achieved in 
the relative burden represented by foreign 
participation in industrialization with regard to 
its foreign exchange cost (table 5). 
In raising the share of local capital in indus-
tries dominated by foreign enterprises, it is clear 
that the policy of promoting mixed enterprises 
was successful. The new companies favoured by 
the policy of substitution in technologically more 
complex industries were made highly con-
ditional on greater national (State) participation, 
as in the cases of Cía. Colombiana de Auto-
motores S.A., Monómeros Colombo-Venezo-
lanos S.A. and the Sociedad de Fabricación de 
Automotores S.A., which were the main mixed 
enterprises operating in Colombia up to 1982 
(table 6). In 1980 the direct foreign investment 
registered in mixed enterprises came to 17% of 
the total of such investment in the manufactur-
ing sector, and if Celanese Colombiana S.A. and 
Enka de Colombia S.A., which were converted 
into mixed enterprises two years later are in-
cluded, the figure rises to 22%. Resolution 11 of 
the Monetary Board adopted in 1976 had a slight 
influence on the conversion of the foreign enter-
prises, as in the case of ALCAN de Colombia S.A. 
when it established a fund of US$ 50 million for 
the purchase of shares in foreign enterprises. 
Through disagreements among local groups, 
however, only 25% of the resources were allo-
cated to the purpose indicated (Latin American 
Review, 1977 a, p. 3, and 1977 b, p. 203). Another 
impact was made by the requirement of Decision 
24 which compelled the foreign enterprises op-
erating if! Colombia and wishing to export to the 
Andean market to sign transformation agree-
ments with the National Planning Department 
(table 7). The enterprises which had signed such 
agreements up to the end of 1982 represented, 
according to data for the year 1980, another 3% 
of the total of direct foreign investment reg-
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Table 6 
COLOMBIA: NAMES OF THE MOST IMPORTANT MIXED ENTERPRISES, 1982 
Mixed enterprises 
Registered direct 
foreign investment in 1980 
(Millions of dollars) group 
Sales in 1982 
(Millions of pesos) 
Cía. Colombiana de Automotores S.A. 
Monómeros Colombo-Venezolanos S.A. 
Eternit Colombiana S.A. 
Soc. de Fabricación de Automotores S.A. 
Aluminio Alean de Colombia S.A. 
Productora Nac. de Llantas S.A. 
Hilandería Medellín S.A. 
Papeles Scott de Colombia S.A. 
Laboratorios Pharmatique S.A. 
Derivados de Maíz S.A. 
Subtotal 10 largest 
Celanese Colombiana S.A.a 
Enka de Colombia S.A.a 
Subtotal 




































Source: Information from the register for 1980 and interviews. 
aForeign enterprises before 1982. 
Table 7 
COLOMBIA: MANUFACTURING ENTERPRISES WHICH HAD SIGNED 
AGREEMENTS WITH THE NATIONAL PLANNING DEPARTMENT TO 
BECOME MIXED COMPANIES UP T O 1982 
Enterprise 
Foreign capital 
(according to the 
1980 register) 



































Productos Avon S.A. 
Abitbol & Bigio Vanytex S.A. 
Sandoz Colombiana S.A. 
Colombia Kimberley S.A. 
Química Antex Ltda. 
Braun de Colombia S.A. 
Lácteos Colombianos Lacol S.A. 
Siemens S.A. 
Aga-Fano S.A. 
Carlo Erba.de Colombia S.A. 
Monarch Colombiana S.A. 
Subtotal 
Other enterprises3 
Total 35 enterprises 
Source: Information supplied by the National Planning Department and enterprises surveyed. 
"Each with less than US$ 500 000 of foreign capital registered for the year 1980. 
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istered in thesector.3 Thus the mixed enterprises 
and those in process of transformation repre-
sented 25% ofthe direct foreign investment reg-
istered in the manufacturing sector at the begin-
ing of the 1980s. These changes accord with the 
expressed intentions ofthe authorities, since be-
tween 1970-1976 and 1977-1981 they raised the 
authorizations for direct foreign investment in 
mixed enterprises (as against foreign and nation-
al enterprises) from 20.5 to 37.4% of the total 
value of the authorizations for these periods. In 
other words, the share of national enterprises in 
the capital of the companies accounting for for-
eign participation in the manufacturing sector 
increased considerably (tables 6 and 7). 
It should be noted that these achievements of 
the policy as regards foreign participation in the 
industrialization process were not due to the effi-
cient functioning ofthe Andean integration pro-
cess, particularly in the case of the sectoral pro-
grammes of industrial development, and even of 
certain aspects of Decision 24. ECLAC studies 
show clearly that towards the end ofthe 1970s, at 
least, the sectoral programmes had not worked 
well, having failed to promote the new invest-
ment needed or to motivate the foreign enter-
prises to change into mixed companies in order 
to participate in the programmes (Gana, 1977; 
Garay, 1977 and Mortimore, 1978). Enterprises 
such as ccA, soFASA and Monómeros were mixed 
before the application of sectoral programmes in 
the motor-vehicle and petrochemical branches, 
and the subsequent transformation of companies 
such as Celanese and Enka was not particularly 
related to the petrochemical programme. Per-
haps the only important case of transformation 
into a mixed enterprise directly linked with the 
programming is that of Carboquímica S.A., 
which produced only one product falling within 
the allocations ofthe petrochemical programme. 
Nor did the Andean market play a very im-
portant role in the expansion of foreign enter-
prises in Colombia, since they generally took the 
view that the domestic market was more attrac-
3 Two firms wich changed into mixed enterprises 
(Celanese Colombiana S.A. and Enka de Colombia S.A.) and 
one enterprise which signed a transformation agreement 
(Carboquímica S.A.) in 1982 are included in the data for the 
year 1980. The list for the year 1982 was not available. 
tive or that other variables (such as the level of 
protection offered by the common external tar-
iff) could be more important for enterprises with 
direct foreign investment than access to the rest 
of the Andean Group (Pérez Salazar, 1980, p. 
72). It is clear, therefore, that the incentives pro-
vided by these instruments had no great in-
fluence on the decisions ofthe enterprises, since 
the negative aspect ofthe instruments (exclusion 
of the foreign enterprises) was more obvious 
than the positive (possibility of accelerated 
growth in a large market). In other words, the 
degree of success that the policy of promoting 
mixed enterprises has achieved is not basically 
due to the incentives offered by the Andean in-
struments, but rather to Colombian internal fac-
tors. Now, all the official indicators and data, and 
even the unofficial ones too, agree that (with the 
exception of the aim of increasing exports of 
manufactures) the official policy largely achieved 
the goals it set itself. If this is so, it would mean 
that the official policy of assigning to foreign 
participation a subsidiary role in Colombian in-
dustrialization gave quite good results. To verify 
this hypothesis the author directly approached 
the main industrial firms with a foreign element 
for their views on the economic policy and its 
effects on foreign participation in the industrial 
sector during the-period 1967-1982. A survey 
was made of the 30 largest firms (on the basis of 
their sales in 1982) with foreign participation in 
the manufacturing sector, representing 58.4% of 
the foreign investment registered in the man-
ufacturing sector at the end of 1980. Of this 
sample, the questionnaire was answered by 24 
firms which represent 50.7% of the foreign in-
vestment registered in the manufacturing sector 
at the end of 1980 and 35.9% ofthe total foreign 
investment (excluding petroleum) recorded in 
the same year. To reach a total of at least 25 
enterprises two interesting cases were added : Ex-
portadora Dupont, one of the foreign firms 
which exports most manufactures in Colombia; 
and Carboquímica, a foreign company in process 
of transformation which competed directly with 
a national company, both producing one of the 
items of the Andean Group petrochemical pro-
gramme. Thus the enterprises surveyed reached 
26 (table 8). 
The survey consisted of a qualitative part, 
with opinions on the industrial and export-
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promotion policies, on the administrative system 
for assessing, authorizing, registering and con-
trolling foreign investment and technology, and 
on the role of Colombia as a recipient of foreign 
investment. The quantitative part was devoted to 
an inquiry on various aspects of the performance 
of the enterprises. 
The interviews which accompanied the sur-
vey were held in May and June of 1983 in the 
cities of Bogotá, Medellín and Cali. 
Table 8 
COLOMBIA: THE LARGEST ENTERPRISES WITH FOREIGN PARTICIPATION SURVEYED, 
IN ORDER OF NET SALES IN 1982 
Colombian enterprise 
Fábrica Colombiana de 
Automotores S.A. 
Cartón de Colombia SA. 
M o n ó m e r o s C o l o m b o - V e -
nezolanos S.A. 
Colgate Palmolive y Cía. 
Productora de Papeles S.A.-
Propal 
Ind. Nestlé de Productos 
Alimenticios S.A. 
Goodyear de Colombia S.A. 
ENKA de Colombia S.A. 
Cristalerías Peldar S.A. 
Ind. Colombiana de Llantas 
S.A. 
Compañía Colombiana 
• Automotriz S.A. 
Dow Química Colombiana S.A. 
Ind. Philips de Colombia S.A. 
Unión Carbide de Colombia 
S.A. 
Siemens S.A. 
Productora Nacional de 
Llantas S.A.d 
Pizano S.A. 
CEAT General de Colombia 
S.A. 
Croydon S.A. 
Celanese Colombiana S.A. 
Eternit Colombiana S.A. 
Gillette de Colombia S.A. 
Hilos Cadena S.A. 
Cementos Boyacá , 
































Main foreign participant 
General Motors Corp. 
Container Corp. (Mobil Oil 
Corp.) 
ivp (Venezuela) DSM 
(Netherlands) 
Colgate Palmolive Inc. 
International Paper Co. 
Nestlé S.A. 
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. 
N.V. Industriel Bezit 
Ovens Illinois Inc. 
B.F. Goodrich Co. 
Fiat S.p.A. (up to 1982) 
Dow Chemical Co. 
N.V. Philips 
Union Carbide Corp. 
Siemens A.G. 
Uniroyal Inc. 
Boise Cascade Inc. 
Ceat International, General 
Cable Corp. 
Uniroyal Inc. 
Celanese Corp. (up to 1982) 
Eternit Co. 
Gillette Co. 
J. and P. Coats Ltd. 
Holderbank Financière Glaris 
E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. 









































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data and interviews with the enterprises, 
"Millions of pesos. 
bMillions of dollars. 
cMixed enterprises or in process of transformation. 
dFormed in 1980 on the basis of the tire branch of the ex-Uniroyal Croydon S.A. 
enterprises added for special reasons. 
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i 
II 
The opinion of the entrepreneurs 
1. The industrial policy of 1967-1982 
The inquiry began with two general questions. If 
a distinction is made between the goal of substitu-
tion of imports in the industries with more com-
plex technology (su complex) and the promotion 
of exports of manufactures (x manuf.) and the 
period 1967-1982 is divided into two subperiods 
(1967-1974 and 1975-1982). 
Question: Which has been more successful? 
su complex 
x manuf. 





















Question: In your opinion, what result has been 
achieved by the policy of promoting the transition from 
the easy substitution of industrial imports to more dif-
ficult substitution or the export of manuf actures in the 
period 1967-1982? 
0 11 12 3 0 
None Slight Moderate Successful Very 
successful 
As may be seen from the results, the entre-
preneurs found that the Colombian industrial 
policy during the period 1967-1982 had had a 
marked emphasis. Opinions were very divided as 
to which objective (substitution of imports of the 
complex industries or exports of manufactured 
products) was more successful during the period 
1967-1982 (after Decree 444 of 1967). 
On dividing the period 1967-1982 into two 
subperiods, it became clear that the goal for 
1967-1974 was mainly to promote industrial ex-
ports an in a lesser degree to substitute imports in 
complex industries. The subperiod 1975-1982 
was ambiguous for these important entre-
preneurs, however, since 11 voted for the 
promotion of the export of manufactures as the 
more successful goal, 10 opted for the substitu-
tion of imports in complex industries and 5 could 
not decide. 
The entrepreneurs considered that the over-
all results during 1967-1982 were only moderate 
(12 enterprises) or slight (11 enterprises); only 3 
considered that the results had been good. It is 
probable that these rather negative opinions on 
the industrial policy reflect in particular their 
experience during the period after 1975, when 
the industrial impetus declined, first as a result of 
the foreign exchange boom and then because of 
the difficulties experienced by entire sectors, 
such as the motor-vehicle industry, in which the 
leading enterprises have suffered losses for two 
to four years running. 
Question: How wouldyou describe Colombian in-
dustrial policy during the period 1967-1982 and the 
subperiods 1967-1974 and 1975-1982? Choose and 
place in order of importance three adjectives appropri-








Subtotal: the three 
highest votes 


































The entrepreneurs showed a critical attitude 
in the adjectives chosen to characterize the in-
4In the survey the entrepreneurs were asked to select 3 
adjectives for each period. In tabulating these results the first 
choice was weighted by 3, the second by 2 and the third by 1. 
The adjectives with the highest marks mentioned for each 
period represented 56, 78 and 47% of the total number of 
options for the periods 1967-1974, 1975-1982 and 1967-
1982, respectively. The values represent "votes" from a total 
of 156 (i.e., 26 x 6). In addition, in order to collect the total 
number of possible replies to this question three options were 
left blank so that the entrepreneur could choose adjectives 
not included in the survey. 
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dustrial policy in 1967-1974, 1975-1982 and the 
total period 1967-1982. The first subperiod was 
described as integrationist, protectionist and 
nationalist and, to a lesser degree, technicalist 
and monetarist. This assessment seems to accord 
well with the Colombian experience of serious 
balance-of-payments problems in the mid-1960s 
and the intention of the new industrial policy 
announced in Decree-Law 444 and the Car-
tagena Agreement. The second subperiod was 
described as monetarist, open-market oriented 
and political and, to a lesser degree, in-
tegrationist; these adjectives admirably repre-
sent the essence of the new neo-liberal trend that 
was introduced into Colombia in 1975-1982. The 
industrial policy in the overall period 1967-1982 
was described as monetarist, political, open-
market oriented and, to a lesser degree, in-
tegrationist, protectionist and nationalist. The 
industrial policy of the subperiod 1975-1982 was 
disliked by the entrepreneurs, who expressed 
their disagreement with monetarism and the 
open-market orientation. There was a pro-
nounced consensus on the adjectives applied to 
the subperiod 1975-1982, which shows not only 
the influence of the most recent period but also a 
very consistent interpretation of its importance 
for the industrialization process. 
Question: Which sectors have benefited the most 
from the industrial policy? Choose three and arrange 
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Subtotal: the three 
highest votes 




























The greatest degree of consistency is seen 
included in national private enterprises. 
in respect of the question as to which sectors 
benefited most from the industrial policy. Dur-
ing the subperiod 1967-1974, according to the 
entrepreneurs, the beneficiaries were national 
private enterprises, the State, and to a lesser de-
gree foreign enterprises. Those who benefited 
most from the industrial policy in 1975-1982 
were national private enterprises (including 
financial groups), the State, and foreign enter-
prises. In the period 1967-1982, the entre-
preneurs considered that the beneficiaries of the 
industrial policy were national private enter-
prises (including financial groups and foreign-
trade enterprises) and the State. Foreign enter-
prises figure to a much lesser extent. 
There appear to be two criteria involved 
here. On the one hand, the entrepreneurs of 
these large firms with foreign participation felt 
that there was discrimination in favour of nation-
al enterprises. This view was undoubtedly the 
result of the application of one of the stated aims 
of Decision 24, namely, that it was necessary to 
establish common rules for foreign investment in 
consonance with the new conditions created by 
the Cartagena Agreement, so that the advan-
tages deriving from it would favour the national 
or mixed enterprises as defined in the statute. On 
the other hand, in 1975-1982 the mention of 
financial groups as beneficiaries of the industrial 
policy might mean that, according to this view, 
even national private-sector industrialists were 
prejudiced by the lack of a clear industrial policy. 
In sum, the opinions of the entrepreneurs of 
the largest firms with foreign participation in the 
manufacturing sector indicate that for them the 
industrial policy during the period 1967-1982 
became increasingly more confused as regards 
the main goal (substitution of industrial imports 
in the industries with more complex technology 
or the promotion of exports of manufactures) 
the results of this policy were only moderate, if 
not downright meagre; and although the in-
tegrationist and protectionist policy in 1967-
1974 benefited mainly national private enter-
prises and the State rather than foreign enter-
prises, the monetarism and open-market 
orientation of the following period channelled 
the benefits towards non-industrial national pri-
vate enterprises and the State. 
Hence, they complain that an initial pre-
judice of the industrial policy against foreign en-
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terprises was aggravated by another bias against 
industry during 1975-1982, so that they were 
doubly injured by the industrial policy. 
2. Promotion of industrial exports 
Question: In general, which have been the most im-
portant instruments employed in Colombia's policy for 
promotion of exports of manufactures? Choose three of 
these and place them in order of importance. 
Exchange rate 
Tax Credit Certificates 
(CAT) 
PROEXPO credits 
The Valiejo Plan 
Subtotal: the three 
largest votes 

























T h e opinions of these entrepreneurs on the 
policy for the promotion of industrial exports 
during 1967-1982 are very clear. The most im-
portant instruments, in their view, are almost 
exclusively the incentives. Thus, in general they 
thought that the financing by PROEXPO, the Tax 
Credit Certificates (CAT) and the Valiejo Plan 
were the most important instruments during 
1967-1982. T o quote a report of the Banco de la 
República, "PROEXPO'S action can be described as 
integral and covers the basic cycle of external 
marketing, from market research, supply of in-
formation, direct promotion abroad, technical 
assistance and handling of insurance, up to the 
flexible, timely and generous granting of credit 
to the exporter on very favourable terms. Re-
cently, in view of the need to intensify still further 
the efforts to develop external sales, new in-
struments have been brought into use, likewise in 
close collaboration with PROEXPO. These relate to 
the creation in 1979 of international marketing 
companies and the development of forms of in-
ternational subcontracting. The basic aim of the 
former is to technify the work of external 
marketing, especially in support of small and 
medium-sized firms which individually do not 
possess the technical and financial capacity to 
develop an efficient external sales strategy. 
Moreover, these societies, given their knowledge 
of the external market and of domestic possibili-
ties, will be able to invest in the sectors which offer 
the best prospects, or act as intermediaries of 
foreign investment. At the same time, they en-
gage in the importation of inputs to supply 
domestic needs, particulary those required by 
national producers who export through them. 
International subcontracting, for its part, con-
stitutes an agreement whereby a national man-
ufacturer supplies partially or fully assembled 
articles to a foreign industry, which undertakes 
to market the resulting product. 
"In the fiscal field" (continues the report), 
"Tax Credit Certificates (CAT) were created 
for the benefit of exporters of non-traditional 
products. These certificates, which are freely 
negotiable and can be used when they mature 
for the payment of any type of tax, have been 
subjected to various reforms designed to give 
them a selective character in order to adapt 
them to the external competitiveness require-
ments of national production. 
"Similarly, it should be noted that the ex-
change rate statute maintains a special import 
and export system, in force since the beginning 
of the 1960s and known as the Valiejo Plan. 
Through this system, national producers can 
bring into the country, free of all tariff charges, 
prior permits, deposits and other requirements, 
raw materials, intermediate products and goods 
destined for export" (Banco de la República, 
1982, pp. 76 and 77). 
During the subperiods 1967-1974 and 1975-
1982 the factors voted for were the same, with a 
relative change of emphasis in the sense that in 
1967-1974 CAT came first, followed by PROEXPO 
and the Valiejo Plan, whereas in 1975-1982 PRO-
EXPO was first followed by CAT and the Valiejo 
Plan. For both the subperiods and the whole 
period 1967-1982 the incentives mentioned re-
presented between 83% and 86% of the replies 
given by these entrepreneurs. 
T h e marked tendency to give special em-
phasis to the incentives among the various in-
struments and factors was also manifest in the 
enterprises which managed to increase the share 
of exports in their total sales in 1967-1974 and 
1975-1982. For the 13 firms 6 which increased 
6
 One enterprise did not give sufficient information, so 
the number was reduced to 12. 
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the share of exports in their total sales during 
1967-1974 theincentives—cAT(15),Vallejo Plan 
(13) and PROEXPO (9)— represented 76% of their 
replies. For the 7 enterprises that increased the 
share of exports in their total sales in 1975-1982 
the incentives —PROEXPO (15), CAT (11) and Va-
llejo Plan (9)— represented 83% of their replies. 
It should be noted, however, that for the 12 firms 
of the subperiod 1967-1974 the exchange rate (9) 
and the increase of external demand (9) were 
considered as important as the support of PRO-
EXPO. The exchange rate and increases in ex-
ternal demand were not important for the 7 en-
terprises which raised their proportion of ex-
ports in total sales in 1975-1982. It would seem 
that the deterioration in the real exchange rate, 
comparing 1967-1974 with 1975-1982, was not 
sufficiently offset by the increase in credit avail-
able through PROEXPO in this latter period. De-
spite the problem of the fall in the real exchange 
rate for exporters between 1967-1974 and 1975-
1982, these complained more of the policy of 
tying new foreign investments to increases 
obtained in export contracts signed with the In-
stitute of Foreign Trade (INCOMEX). Half the new 
investments authorized in 1977-1981 were sub-
ject to this condition, and although only 13 of the 
26 enterprises signed export contracts with IN-
COMEX in 1975-1982,17 of the 26 considered that 
the policy was negative and 13 out of 18 sug-
gested that it had not been successful. 
Question: In general, what is your opinion of the 
policy of tying new foreign investments to increases in 
exports through export contracts signed with INCOMEX? 
9 17 
positive negative 
Question: Has the tying policy been successful? 
0 5 13 8 
Yes Fairly No Did 
not answer 
Considering that only 2 of the 13 enterprises 
which had export contracts with INCOMEX did not 
achieve the goal agreed up to the end of 1982 and 
that the tying policy is in a legally weak position 
for applying fines, it is surprising that the opin-
ions of these entrepreneurs are so unfavour-
able. Perhaps the explanation lies in their repeat-
ed comment that failure to fulfil the contract 
brought with it practical consequences as regards 
the official authorizations required in other 
aspects of their operations (new investment, im-
ports, technology contracts, price increases). 
Many complained that "one cannot export 
by decree" and that there was a gap between the 
policy of export promotion and the economic 
policy in 1975-1982. It seems, however, that they 
were more concerned about a new increase in the 
power of the administrative system to assess, au-
thorize, register and control foreign investment 
and technology in Colombia, as expressed in the 
tying policy with regard to exports. 
3. The new administrative system for 
assessing, authorizing, registering 
and controlling foreign investment 
Question: In your opinion, what have been the 
main objectives generally pursued by the administrative 
system in redefining foreign investment? Choose three 
and place them in order of importance. 
45 T o regulate remittances abroad of profits, royalties, 
interest, etc. 
31 To direct foreign investment to specific sectors or 
activities 
22 To promote mixed enterprises 
21 To co-ordinate foreign participation with the goals of 
economic policy 
98 Subtotal of the three largest votes 
156 Total of all the votes 
In the view of the entrepreneurs, the general 
objectives of the administrative system were to 
regulate remittances abroad, direct foreign in-
vestment to specific sectors or activities, promote 
mixed enterprises and co-ordinate foreign 
participation with the goals of the economic poli-
cy. For the enterprises, the factors with the great-
est influence in 1967-1982 were the regulation of 
remittances abroad, the incentivation of in-
dustrial exports, the promotion of mixed enter-
prises, the improvement of the transfer of for-
eign technology, and the reservation of local cred-
it for national enterprises. Themost influential 
factors were practically the same in the two sub-
periods: in 1967-1974 the most noted factors 
were the regulation of remittances abroad, the 
incentivation of industrial exports, the promo-
tion of mixed enterprises, the improvement of 
the transfer of foreign technology and the 
reservation of local credit for national enter-
prises; in 1975-1982 the order of the factors 
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changed very slightly, with the reservation of 
local credit for national enterprises preceding 
the improvement of the transfer of foreign tech-
nology, the order of the other factors remaining 
unchanged. Apart from the aspects mentioned, 
among the general goals of the administrative 
system the entrepreneurs found that the in-
centivation of industrial exports, the improve-
ment in the transfer of foreign technology and 
the reservation of local credit for national enter-
prises were the aspects of the administrative sys-
tem which had the greatest effect on the develop-
ment of the larger enterprises with foreign 
participation in the manufacturing sector. In 
other words, the entrepreneurs had a very good 
grasp of the general message of the administra-
tive system and were able to distinguish other 
factors which had had a more powerful influence 
on the development of their own enterprises. 
Question: Which aspects of the official policy in-
fluenced the development of your enterprise during 
1967-1982 and in the two subperiods mentioned? 
Select three and place them in order of importance. 
1967- 1967- 1975-
1982 1974 1982 
41 42 37 Regulation of remittances abroad 
of profits, royalties, interest 
18 18 16 Promotion of mixed enterprises 
18 15 12 Improvementintransferofforeign 
technology 
23 27 27 Incentivation of industrial exports 
18 14 15 Reservation of local credit for 
national enterprises 
82 87 80 Subtotal of the three largest votes 
156 156 156 Total of all the votes 
Regarding the institutions of the administra-
tive system which had the greatest influence on 
the development of these enterprises,7 the 
following were mentioned: National Planning 
Department (DNP), PROEXPO and the INCOMEX 
Import Board and, to a lesser degree, the Royal-
ties Committee (CR) and the export contracts 
o f INCOMEX. 
The relative importance of these institutions, 
according to the persons interviewed, changed 
7Not only the administrative institution but also the 
corresponding function is indicated, since some institutions, 
such as INCOMEX, perform more than one function in relation 
to the operations of enterprises with foreign participation. 
somewhat during the two subperiods. In 1967-
1974 the most influential institutions were the 
DNP, the INCOMEX Import Board, PROEXPO, the CR 
and the export contracts of INCOMEX. 
In the second subperiod, PROEXPO, DNP, the 
INCOMEX Import Board, the export contracts of 
INCOMEX and the CR were the most influential 
institutions for the development of these im-
portant firms. These changes are consistent with 
the features of each subperiod from the balance-
of-payments viewpoint, since 1967-1974 was 
characterized by a difficult balance-of-payments 
situation, while 1975-1982 was a boom period as 
regards foreign exchange. 
Question: Which institutions or public enterprises 
have had the greatest influence on the development of 
your enterprise? Indicate the three most influential in 
order of importance. 
DNP: authorization of investment 
PROEXPO: financial assistance 
INCOMEX: Import Board 
INCOMEX: export contracts 
Royalties Committee: technology 
contracts 
Subtotal of the three largest votes 
Total of all the votes 
The entrepreneurs were asked to grade the 
impact of the functions of the institutions and 
public enterprises on the operations of their 
companies. Disregarding the replies indicating 
that the impact had not been significant, the in-
sinuations with the most positive assessments (to-
tal of positives less negatives) were PROEXPO (19), 
Banco de la República (18), the Import Board of 
INCOMEX (15), the DNP (authorization of invest-
men t ) (12) and the DNP (authorizat ion of 
reinvestment) (8). The functions and institutions 
with negative assessments were the Royalties 
Committee (—2), INCOMEX (—1) (access to the 
Andean market), DNP (norms on local content) 
(— 1), the industrial promotion of the Institute of 
Industrial Development (0), the petrochemical 
promotion of ECOPETROL (0), and the price and 
production controls of the Ministry of Economic 
Development (0). T h r e e functions and in-
stitutions (the INCOMEX export contracts, the 
capital in limbo of the Institute of Industrial De-
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tendency of Joint Stock Companies) received + 5. 
In other words, the institutions which in the 
opinion of the entrepreneurs had the most 
negative impact on the functioning of these large 
enterprises were the Royalties Commitee 
(transfer of foreign technology), INCOMEX 
(access to the Andean market), the DNP 
(fulfilment of goals on local content), the 
sectoral promotion of public enterprises such 
as IFI and ECOPETROL, and the price and 
production controls administered by the 
Ministry of Economic Development. 
Although it did not figure as an explicit 
aspect of the impact of the institutions of the 
administrative system on the functioning of en-
terprises, one of the general aims of the adminis-
trative system —to promote mixed enterprises— 
has had a notable influence if 1970-1976 is com-
pared with 1977-1981. Overall, the proportion 
of new investments authorized in relation to 
mixed enterprises (i.e., not foreign or national 
enterprises) rose from 21% to 37% of the total. 
Of the 26 companies interviewed, nine are now 
mixed or national (as of 1982) or have signed an 
agreement to become mixed, and four are think-
ing of doing so. The entrepreneurs declared, 
without exception, that there is no official pres-
sure in this sense, but it was manifest that the 
additional advantages for mixed enterprises car-
ry increasing weight in the decisions taken by the 
directors of the foreign enterprises. In other 
words, in contrast to what happened in the pe-
troleum sector (contracts of association) and the 
financial sector (shrinking of the banking sys-
tem), the policy of redefining foreign participa-
tion in the manufacturing sector has not been 
characterized either by direct State action or by 
strong official pressure. 
Question: Do you believe that the administrative 
system for assessing, authorizing, registering and con-
trolling foreign investment achieved its goals in the 
period 1967-1982? 
0 12 5 9 0 
Completely Largely Moderately Partially Not at all 
Considering all the initiatives designed to re-
define foreign participation in the manufactur-
ing sector, it is noteworthy that, according to the 
entrepreneurs themselves, the policy has been 
quite successful. Thus, twelve of those in-
terviewed considered that the policy had been 
largely successful, five thought that it had been 
moderately successful and nine that it had been 
partially successful. None of them voted for total 
success or total failure. In other words, the en-
trepreneurs confirmed beyond doubt that the 
situation of the dominant foreign participants in 
the Colombian industrialization process had 
been substantially redefined in 1967-1982. 
The opinions of the directors interviewed 
regarding the changes in the power of negotia-
tion with the official sector and with the national 
private sector confirmed the impact of the policy 
for redefining foreign participation in the in-
dustrial sector. Applying a scale from 1 to 10, in 
which 1 signifies very strong bargaining power 
for the national participants, the entrepreneurs 
considered on average that there had been a 
sharp change in bargaining power in favour of 
the official sector. According to them, it rose 
from 4.8 in 1967 to 6.7 in 1974 and 6.8 in 1982. 
This may signify that the presence of the State is 
becoming increasingly important and its control 
over the behaviour of the enterprises with a for-
eign element is increasingly strict. With regard to 
the negotiations of foreign enterprises with the 
national private sector in the latter's role of 
share-holders, suppliers, and customers the 
bargaining power has also changed, with that of 
the national private sector increasing from an 
average of 5.5 in 1967 to 7.1 in 1982. In other 
words, in contrast to their practice prior to De-
cree-Law 444, the main foreign participants have 
changed their attitude and have begun to negoti-
ate with the local participants as a result of the 
impact of the new administrative system. 
In sum, during the period 1967-1982 the 
administrative system for assessing, authorizing, 
registering and controlling foreign investment 
and technology has had a noteworthy impact on 
foreign participation in the manufacturing sec-
tor. It seems reasonable to conclude that the poli-
cy for redefining foreign participation in Co-
lombian industrialization has created a new situa-
tion for the leading foreign investors. 
4. Colombia as a recipient of 
foreign investment, 1967-1982 
As a result of the changes in the nature of foreign 
participation in the Colombian industrialization 
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process, the entrepreneurs of these large firms, 
with the exception of one enterprise which did 
not answer this question, declared that Colombia 
had been "moderately satisfactory" as a recipient 
of foreign investment during 1967-1982. Nine-
teen of them were of this opinion, while five 
considered Colombia "bad" as a recipient and 
one opted for "good". Considering the two sub-
periods-separately, however, it is evident that 
according to them Colombia was a much better 
recipient of foreign investment in 1967-1974 
than in 1975-1982. For the first subperiod 
the predominant adjectives were "good" and 
"moderately satisfactory", whereas for the sub-
period 1975-1982 they were "moderately satis-
factory" and "bad". It is obvious, therefore, that 
the persons interviewed considered that Co-
lombia's situation as a recipient of foreign invest-
ment worsened in 1975-1982 as compared with 
1967-1974, although this subperiod witnessed 
the initiation of the new administrative system 
for assessing, authorizing, registering and con-
trolling foreign investment and technology, 
based on foreign exchange control and greater 
negotiating power on the part of the official sec-
tor. Their opinions are reflected in table 2, which 
shows that the real value of direct foreign invest-
ment in the manufacturing sector was barely 
maintained between 1977 and 1981. 
Question: How would you characterize Colombia 
To sum up, with the exception of the promotion 
of exports of manufactures, the Colombian poli-
cy designed to bring foreign participation in line 
with the official goals (i.e., to direct investment 
towards substitution in technologically more 
complex industries, to reduce the foreign ex-
change cost of foreign participation and to im-
prove national participation) has been a success, 
in the opinion of the entrepreneurs affected. On 
the basis of these assessments it may readily be 
concluded that the official policy has had a 
marked effect in reorienting foreign participa-
tion in Colombian industrialization towards a 
as a recipient of foreign investment during the period 
1967-1982? 
0 1 19 5 0 
Excellent Good Moderately Bad Very bad 
satisfactory 
a) In the subperiod 1967-1974: 
0 8 10 6 1 
Excellent Good Moderately Bad Very bad 
satisfactory 
b) In the subperiod 1975-1982: 
0 1 H 10 o 
Excellent Good Moderately Bad Very bad 
satisfactory 
Finally, when asked whether they thought 
official policies of other Latin American coun-
tries were more favourable to foreign invest-
ment than that of Colombia, 16 answered yes, 
quoting mainly the cases of Brazil and Chile and 
holding that their policies offered greater in-
centives and less rigorous conditions than that 
of Colombia. Nevertheless, very few of the entre-
preneurs were able to make a formal distinction 
between the basic features of the Brazilian model 
and the Chilean one, so that their preferences 
seemed to lack a solid foundation. 
subsidiary role. The technical influence of the 
administrative system for assessing, authorizing, 
registering and controlling participation in a 
continuous and progressive manner gave rise to 
the following comment by the Board of the Car-
tagena Agreement (1979, p. 53): "An analysis of 
the functioning of the institutional structure 
responsible for the authorization, registration 
and control of foreign investment in Colombia 
leads to the general conclusion that it has had 
satisfactory results and that Colombia now has a 
wide experience at its command which can be 
profitably used by some of the other countries". 
Ill 
Conclusions 
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Nonetheless, there are still certain doubts 
(which go beyond the scope of this article) as to its 
capacity to impose a subsidiary role on the for-
eign participants. For instance, although it is quite 
true that progress has been made in "Co-
lombianization", it is not known whether this pro-
cess was independent of or detrimental to "mod-
ernization". The new direct foreign investment 
has been channelled towards the metal man-
ufactures and machinery industry, but, judging 
by the precarious state of several of the largest 
enterprises in this sector (especially the motor-
vehicle industries) during the present crisis, it is 
not at all clear that the new investment is going 
to speed up the growth of the sector as a whole. 
Moreover, the mediocre results in exports of 
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tion process. Finally, from a comparative angle, it 
is not quite clear to what extent the relatively 
meagre participation of foreign investment in 
Colombian industry has played a part in the suc-
cess obtained in redefining such participation.8 
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